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I. INTRODUCTION
In recognition of the development of unfair competition as an independent
body of law,' the American Law Institute in 1995 published the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition (Restatement),2 the Institute's first independent
work on the subject. This work examines common law principles, statutory
provisions, and judicial rulings that constitute the law of unfair competition.
Section 25 of the Restatement analyzes the doctrine of trademark dilution, and
is entitled "Liability Without Proof of Confusion: Dilution and Tarnishment. "I
As highlighted in the title of section 25, the dilution doctrine reaches
beyond the traditional question of "likelihood of confusion" and provides a
remedy for the unauthorized use of a mark that either tarnishes or diminishes
its distinctiveness. The Restatement identifies the underlying rationale for both
prongs of trademark dilution:
Tarnishment and dilution of distinctiveness, although conceptually distinct,
both undermine the selling power of a mark, the latter by disturbing the
conditioned association of the mark with the prior user and the former by
displacing positive with negative associations. Thus, tarnishment and
dilution of distinctiveness reduce the value of the mark to the trademark
4
owner.

Relief for trademark infringement remedies public confusion, while relief for
dilution is based on injury to the trademark and the trademark owner, and on
the unjust enrichment of one who trades upon the commercial magnetism of
another's mark. In contrast to trademark infringement, dilution is premised on
a theory of trespass rather than fraud or deceit.' The doctrine protects the
commercial value or "selling power" of a mark by prohibiting uses that dilute
the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish the associations evoked by the
6
mark.

1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (transcript of proceedings discussing
Tentative Draft No. 1, at 460) (1989).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1993) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
3. Hereinafter referred to as "section 25." Section 25 follows the traditional Restatement
pattern, beginning with a black letter statement of the law as the Reporters believe it is, or as it
should be interpreted. Comments, interpretive illustrations, and a Reporters' note follow, citing
and discussing cases relating to dilution generally and to matters raised by section 25.
4. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. c.
5. See Milton W. Handler, Are the State AntidilutionLaws Compatible With the National
Protectionof Trademarks?,75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 274-75 (1985) (citing Frank I. Schechter,
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,40 HARv. L. REv. 813 (1927)).
6. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. a.
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In Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.7 Justice
Frankfurter eloquently described the threat to commercial magnetism targeted
by dilution statutes, stating:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols.... A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once
this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism ofthe symbol he has created,the
owner can obtain legal redress.8

Despite judicial recognition of the property-like qualities of trademarks,
numerous courts and commentators have cautioned against unrestricted
application of the dilution doctrine. These authorities conclude that certain uses
of trademarks by those who do not own the marks are protected by the First
Amendment 9 and by "fair competition" doctrines such as comparative
advertising. 10 In the context of this historical conflict, section 25 of the

7. 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
8. Id. at 205; see also Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928)
(emphasis added) (discussing the emerging sentiment that a merchant may have a sufficient
economic interest in the use of his mark to warrant protection without a likelihood of consumer
confusion). Modem courts also recognize the degree to which "commercial magnetism"
represents a property value entitled to protection from "poachers." See, e.g. Augusta Nat'l, Inc.
v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 210, 221 (S.D. Ga. 1976) ("[U]se of
the name [Masters] will enable the defendant to get a free ride upon the good will and reputation
built up by the plaintiff, and to that extent the value of plaintiff's property right in its trade-mark
[will be] diluted and rendered less valuable.") (quoting Esquire, Inc. v. Maira, 101 F. Supp. 398,
402 (M.D. Pa. 1951)); Adirondack Appliance Repair, Inc. v. Adirondack Appliance Parts, Inc.,
538 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (finding that the defendant's use of the name
diluted the goodwill and reputation enjoyed by plaintiff).
9. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490 n.7 (10th Cir.
1987) (noting that First Amendment protection has been extended to some noncommercial
parodies of trademarks); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir.
1987) (raising First Amendment concerns about the application of state anti-dilution statutes to
noncommercial uses of a trademark), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987); Girl Scouts of the
United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(denying relief for defamation without a showing of special circumstances); Robert C. Denicola,

Trademarksas Speech: ConstitutionalImplicationsof the EmergingRationalesfor the Protection
of the Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158 (1982); Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark
Parody:A Fair Use and FirstAmendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079 (1986).
10. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) ("As long as the

Published by Scholar Commons, 1996

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:629

Restatement was first published in the Second Tentative Draft of the Restatement."
Section 25 of the Tentative Draft engendered little comment or criticism
for more than three years. However, at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the
International Trademark Association, the Tentative Draft was the subject of
criticism based on two controversial issues: technical trademark use and the
scope of a trademark parodist's free speech rights."
Regarding technical trademark use, the Tentative Draft was criticized for
providing that liability for dilution arises only when an actor uses another's
mark "as a designation to identify [the actor's] own goods ..
"13 Critics
argued that this provision made an artificial and unsupported distinction
between so-called "trademark use" and "non-trademark use." 4 In an
apparent response to these concerns, the Reporters eliminated the technical
trademark use requirement in the final version of section 25 by conditioning
liability on use of a designation "in a manner that is likely to associate the
other's mark with the goods, services, or business of the actor." 5 The
change to an "association" standard rather than a trademark use requirement
suggests that the Reporters intended to liberalize the test for dilution under
section 25. However, the Reporters did not make corresponding revisions to
the comments to section 25, which can still be read to support the trademark
use requirement espoused in the Tentative Draft. 6 Thus, read together, the

mark is not altered [in a comparative advertisement], such use serves the beneficial purpose of
imparting factual information about the relative merits of competing products and poses no risk
of diluting the selling power of the competitor's mark.").
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990),
[hereinafter Tentative Draft].
12. See Letter from Richard M. Berman, Past President of International Trademark
Association, to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Executive Director, American Law Institute,
Yale Law School (September 3, 1993) (on file at the offices of Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta,
Georgia) (noting INTA's "significant concern" about section 25 of the Tentative Draft); see also
Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand
Equity as Protectible Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 24346
(1994), reprintedin 84 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1994) (criticizing portions of the dilution section
of the Tentative Draft).
13. Tentative Draft, supra note 11, § 25(1).
14. Section 25(1) of the Tentative Draft provides: "An actor is subject to liability under such
a statute if, as a designationto identify its own goods, services or business,the actor ... [engages in conduct that dilutes another's mark]." Tentative Draft, supra note 11, § 25(1) (emphasis
added). See also Swann & Davis, supra note 12, at 243.
15. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25(1) (emphasis added).
16. See infra note 63 and corresponding text. In fairness to the Reporters, the questions raised
by critics were apparently not voiced by any organized group until the Institute had all but
adopted in final form the Tentative Draft version of section 25. The authority of the Reporters
to make extensive substantive changes, as opposed to editorial changes, at that late stage was
limited without reconsideration by the Institute.
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text and comments to the final version of section 25 leave open the argument
that the Restatement views technical trademark use as a determinative factor
in the dilution inquiry. Without additional legislation or judicial guidance, the
trademark use requirement remains relevant under the final version of section
25(1). 17
The second subject of criticism arose from the fact that section 25(2) of
the Tentative Draft appears to afford sweeping First Amendment protection to
an actor who uses another's mark to "comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody,
or disparage the other or the other's goods

. .

.[unless] the actor's conduct

meets the requirements of a cause of action for defamation, or invasion of
privacy, or injurious falsehood." 8 This aspect of the Tentative Draft was
criticized for attemipting to create an irrebuttable presumption that the First
Amendment protects all diluting or tarnishing uses of another's mark that
convey an editorial, parodic or critical message. Section 25(2) of the Tentative
Draft implies that, if the mark is used as a parody, then by definition it cannot
satisfy the trademark use requirement.' 9 Critics alleged that section 25(2) of
the Tentative Draft ignores the role of brand equity as an intangible asset of
the trademark owner, and argued that, properly viewed as property rights in
intangible assets, trademark rights should be balanced against or be on par
with First Amendment rights.2' In contrast to their response to criticism of
the trademark use requirement, the Reporters did not accede to these criticisms
of the First Amendment protection provided by section 25(2) of the Tentative
Draft. The broad protection afforded diluting or tarnishing trademark parodies
remains intact in the final version of section 25(2), leaving trademark owners
with substantial concern about the adequacy and fairness of the test. As with
17. Although the authors question certain language in section 25 of the Restatement, to do so
without acknowledging the well-balanced brilliance of the Restatement as a whole would be a
disservice to our profession. As a whole, the Restatement is a concise and understandable
statement of principles governing the law of unfair competition.
18. Tentative Draft, supra note 11, § 25(2).
19. The pertinent portion of section 25(2) states:
One who uses a designation that resembles the trademark ... of another, not in a
manner that is likely to associate the other's mark with the goods ... of the actor,
but ratherto comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or disparage the other or the
other's goods ... is subject to liability without proof of a likelihood of confusion
only if ....
RESTATEMENT,

supra note 2, § 25(2) (emphasis added).

20. Swann & Davis, supra note 12, at 222. "[T]he positive associations that comprise a
brand-a brand's equity-can rise to the level of a property right entitled to protection separately
irrespective of confusion.. . ." Id. at 220. Swann and Davis argue that the dilution doctrine
inadequately protects the property-like qualities of trademarks. Cf. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Plaintiffs trademark is in
the nature of a property right, and as such it need not 'yield to the exercise of First Amendment
rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.'")
(citations omitted) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972)).
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section 25(1) of the Tentative Draft, the Reporters changed the trademark use
requirement of section 25(2) to the "association" standard but did not make
corresponding changes to the comments, which still suggest a narrow
trademark use requirement.21
The critical response to section 25 of the Tentative Draft raised fundamental questions about several issues, including: (1) the capacity of nontrademark
uses to dilute or tarnish; and (2) the permissible scope of dilution statutes,
even in the case of trademark usage, in light of the First Amendment rights of
a parodist. This article examines these issues as they arise from both the
Tentative Draft and the final version of the Restatement. Section II outlines the
substance of the dilution doctrine. Section III examines section 25(1) of the
Restatement, focusing on the meaning of the "association" standard, and the
tension between the "association" standard and the comments, which suggest
that trademark use may be an element of a dilution claim. Finally, section IV
discusses whether section 25(2) adequately balances the various interests at
stake in a trademark parody case.
II. THE TWO PRONGS OF THE DILUTION DOCTRINE
As with other doctrines of unfair competition, trademark dilution has
evolved significantly during the latter portion of the twentieth century.
Although courts reluctantly applied early dilution statutes," many commentators regard the decision in Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical
Trades, Inc.'3 as marking the beginning of a period of increasing judicial
acceptance of the doctrine. Twenty-seven states have adopted dilution
statutes2 largely modeled after section 12 of the Model State Trademark
Bill.' Other jurisdictions appear to have adopted the doctrine by judicial

21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. i.
22. For commentary tracing the acceptance of the dilution doctrine from its antecedents in
early German and English cases and the classic Schechter work, to the current era of broad
acceptance, see Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813, 831-33 (1927); Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 108, 1109-11 (1993)).

23. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977).
24. See Julie Arthur Garcia, Trademark Dilution: Eliminating Confusion, 85 TRADEMARK
REP. 489, 493-94 n.26 (1995).
25. As originally drafted, section 12 of the Model Bill stated:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality
of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law ... shall be a
ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
MODEL ST. TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (U.S. Trademark Ass'n 1949), reprintedin, INTERNATIONAL
TRADEMARK ASS'N, STATE TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, App. 1-20 (Supp. 1996).
In 1992, the dilution section of the Model Bill was amended and recodified as section 13. See
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decree.2 6 Additionally, President Clinton recently signed the first federal
dilution statute,27 which promises to add a new layer of issues to those raised
by the state statutes and the Restatement.2 8
The dilution doctrine protects against two types of harm. First, the
doctrine prevents use of a mark that causes the "blurring" or "whittling away"
of the distinctive quality of the mark.29 This facet of the dilution doctrine
protects the ability of certain marks to "evoke among prospective purchasers
a positive response that is associated exclusively with the goods or services of
the trademark owner. "1 Liability is triggered when a junior user utilizes a
mark in a manner that causes a mental connection between the junior user's
mark and the senior user's mark, and, as a result of the connection, "the
ability of the senior user's mark to serve as a unique identifier of the [senior
user's] goods or services is weakened because the relevant public now also
associates that designation with a new and different source."31 Instead of
evoking an immediate response from purchasers, the senior mark is left to

MODEL ST. TRADEMARK BILL (as amended) § 13 (U.S. Trademark Ass'n 1992), reprintedin,
INTERNATIONALTRADEMARK ASS'N, STATE TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, atApp.

1-11. Section 13 is substantially similar to the new federal dilution statute, and the Connecticut,
South Carolina and Washington dilution statutes are modeled after section 13 of the Model Bill.
26. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir.
1987) ("Dilution claims ... are cognizable under Ohio's common law."); Prince Mfg., Inc. v.
Bard Int'l Assocs., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1419, 1421 (D.N.J. 1988) (applying New Jersey
common law); Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1541-42 (D.
Colo. 1986) (applying Colorado common law), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Adolph Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, 486 F. Supp. 131,
134 (D. Colo. 1980) (applying Colorado common law); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar's Palace,
490 F. Supp. 818, 828-29 (D.N.J. 1980) (applying New Jersey common law and granting relief
on grounds similar to dilution); Kimberly Knitwear, Inc. v. Kimberley Stores, Inc., 331 F. Supp.
1339, 1341-42 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (applying Michigan common law). But see Aero-Motive Co.
v. U.S. Aeromotive, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 29 (1996) ("Michigan... has no common law cause
of action for trademark dilution."); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists Ass'n of Greater Cleveland,
603 F. Supp. 35, 39 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (stating that dilution is a creature of statute and declining
to apply the doctrine as part of the Ohio common law). INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASS'N,
STATE TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, supra note 25, provides a state-by-state

review of dilution statutes and case law.
27. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (creating
section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 1996)).
28. For a discussion of the federal dilution statute, see Miles J. Alexander & Michael K.
Heilbronner, Dilution Under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, _ LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. __,
(forthcoming 1996); Sandra Edelman & Bruce R. Ewing, The FederalTrademarkDilution Act
of 1995: A Litigation Perspective, _ TRADEMARK REP. _ (forthcoming 1996).
29. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989)).
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. c.
31. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.13[l]b], at24-

108 (3d ed. 1992).
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compete with similar marks. Over time, as other uses crowd the market for
mental associations, the senior mark becomes ordinary.
The second harm targeted by the dilution doctrine is tarnishment, which
is regarded by some commentators as merely another means of blurring the
32
distinctive, positive image of a mark, and, therefore, not a separate prong.
Tarnishment occurs when an actor uses a mark similar to the senior user's in
a way that creates an undesirable, unwholesome, or unsavory association with
the senior user's mark.33 Decisions in which plaintiffs have been successful
in asserting a cause of action sustainable only under a dilution statute, and not
on a likelihood of confusion theory, often are based on the tarnishment prong
of dilution.34 The injury to the trademark owner occurs because the appearance of the mark in a distasteful setting results in a distortion of the positive
association connected to a brand. As noted in comment i to section 25: "The
positive images associated with a particular designation 35can be tarnished by
either a trademark or a nontrademark use by the actor."
III. SECTION 25(1) OF THE RESTATEMENT: LIBERALIZATION OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR TECHNICAL TRADEMARK USE

As originally conceived by Frank Schechter, dilution required use of a
well-known mark as a trademark or service mark on noncompetitive goods or
services.36 Schechter's examples of dilution involved trademark use, 3 7 and
the majority of published dilution cases involve use of a mark in a "trademark
sense" to identify a source for goods or services, or at least to "associate" the
mark with the goods or services of the subsequent user.38 It is unclear
whether the empirical disparity between dilution cases involving trademark use
versus nontrademark use is the result of doctrinal concern over the far
reaching scope of dilution statutes. No dilution statute conditions liability on
trademark use, and several expressly provide protection for names, marks or
forms of advertisement,39 a category that encompasses a variety of nontrade-

32. Id. § 24.14[2], at 24-124, -125.
33. See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43.
34. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2006, 2012-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods. Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124
(BNA), 133-35 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. i.
36. See Schechter, supra note 22, at 825.
37. Id. at 826-30.
38. See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43 ("The [district [c]ourt noted that 'the instant case [wa]s
one offirst impression' because it involved a defendant's use of a competitor's trademark to refer
to the competitor's products rather than to identify the defendant's products.") (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1988) (emphasis added); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-1-451(b) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, 1035/15 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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mark uses. Likewise, no consistent line of cases appears to have expressly read
a technical trademark use requirement into a dilution statute.'
An alternative explanation for the historical disparity between dilution
cases involving trademark use compared to those involving nontrademark use
41
is the fact that trademark use occurs more often than nontrademark use,
and, as a result, infringing and diluting uses of another's mark are more likely
to occur in the context of a trademark use.
A. The Trademark Use Requirement
Despite alternative possibilities and the plain language of the dilution
statutes, the Reporters to the Restatement initially determined that "trademark
use" was a prerequisite for dilution, whether by whittling away or tarnishment,
stating that dilution could arise only when an actor used a mark "to identify
its own goods, services, or business ...."42 The comments to the Tentative
Draft state the rationale behind the trademark use requirement:
The rule stated in this Section distinguishes between those cases in
which the actor uses another's designation to identify ... itself or its own
goods or services, and those cases in which the actor uses the other's
designation in some other manner. The protection accorded by the law of
trademarks is limited to the exploitation of a designation as an identifying
symbol. Although the antidilution statutes extend protection to certain
nonconfusing uses, they remain part of the general law of trademarks and
should be applicable only to disputes involving the concurrent
use of
43
similar designations to identify goods, services or businesses.
Regarding other uses, the comments continue:
Nontrademarkuses, which do not involve a use to identify another'sgoods,
services, or business ...are unlikely to have this diluting effect. In most
instances such uses are intended to refer back to the original trademark
owner and serve to confirm rather than undermine the associational
significance of the mark."

40. But see Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 790, 802 (N.D. III. 1989),

aff'd, 909 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1016 (1990) ("The purpose of [the Illinois
dilution statute] is presumably not to stifle the non-trademark use of descriptive words.").
41. See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43.
42. Tentative Draft, supra note 11, § 25(1).
43. Id. § 25 cmt. c (emphasis added).
44. Id.§ 25 cmt. i (emphasis added).
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Thus, the trademark use requirement in the Tentative Draft, which is
reflected in the comments to the final version of the Restatement,4" is based
on the following propositions: (1) the law of trademarks is limited to cases
involving technical trademark use; (2) regardless of their language, dilution
statutes remain part of the general law of trademarks; and (3) nontrademark
use is unlikely to result in dilution. Without a line of supporting authority to
justify these propositions,46 the sweeping requirement of trademark use rests
on questionable underpinnings. As an initial matter, the law of unfair
competition through the use of trademarks goes beyond cases involving
trademark use,47 and courts have found dilution or tarnishment in a variety
of cases not involving use of a senior user's mark as a trademark for a junior
user's products or services. 48 Additionally, although dilution statutes are
"part" of the law of trademarks and unfair competition, they significantly
expand the scope of traditional trademark law, under which infringement
depends on proof of a likelihood of confusion. The language of every dilution
statute provides for liability notwithstanding the absence of likely confusion."9
Recognizing that "the dilution doctrine is not embraced by the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, " courts have taken up the broadening effect of the
dilution statutes to find dilution absent a likelihood of confusion. 5 Thus, the

45. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. i.
46. The Comments to the Tentative Draft do not provide any legal support that compels
acceptance of these propositions.
47. For example, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), and state
dilution statutes do not require technical trademark use.
48. See, e.g., Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43, 45 (stating that the plaintiff's mark was used "to
refer to the competitor's products rather than to identify the defendant's products"); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
903 (1995) (mock advertisement on back cover of humor magazine for "Michelob Oily"
products); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d
Cir. 1979) (use of Dallas Cowboys cheerleaders trade dress); DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited
Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118-19 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (use of "Super Stud" and
"Wonder Wench" by Monkey Business singing telegram business dilutes SUPERMAN and
WONDER WOMAN marks); Pillsbury Co., 215 U.S.P.Q. at 134 n.12 (figures in publication
resembling, but not likely to be confused with, Pillsbury's "Poppin Fresh" and "Poppie Fresh"
characters diluted plaintiffs trademarks even though the offending "'advertisement' [did] not
promote any product whatsoever").
49. See state dilution statutes cited in Garcia, supranote 24, at 493-94 n.26. See also Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985.
50. Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034, 1036 n.7 (11th Cir.
1982) (citations omitted).
51. See, e.g., Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 44; Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming
injunction granted only under blurring prong); Community Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff,
678 F.2d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 1982) (reversing denial of injunction under blurring prong);
American Express Co., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2012-13; Pillsbury Co., 215 U.S.P.Q. at 135;
Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding
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intent and effect of dilution statutes is to expand the law of unfair competition
and supplement the common law and traditional federal and state statutory
schemes, 52 a change not merely of degree, but of kind.
Finally, the proposition that dilution is unlikely to result from nontrademark use arguably is unsound and inconsistent with the case law. Indeed,
comment i to section 25 of the Restatement, entitled "Nontrademark uses,"
acknowledges that "[tihe distinction between the use of another's mark as a
trademark for the actor's own goods or services and a nontrademark use of the
mark is not always obvious .

.

. 53 Despite this acknowledgement, the

Restatement provides less than clear guidance as to how the trademark use
requirement should be applied in the dilution context. The bright-line
trademark use rule does not account for the fact that dilution might arise from
nontrademark uses, including use of a name, mark or form of advertisement,54 to enhance the commercial value or draw attention to the second
comer's products or services. 5
Thus, a trademark use requirement arguably does not prohibit ornamental
placement of marks such as ROLLS-ROYCE or COKE on separately branded
novelty merchandise such as coffee mugs, key chains, watches, beach chairs
or T-shirts, particularly if the use was in the form of a parody and/or was
tarnishing. In support of this result, the Reporters state that ornamental and
merchandising uses of marks "confirm rather than undermine the associational
significance of the mark."56 Although possibly true for some consumers, a
significant possibility exists that the ornamental use also would have the
opposite effect on others. Thus, a nontrademark, decorative use of the
ROLLS-ROYCE "Flying Lady" design mark on a Schwinn brand bike would
not be actionable, even though, for some consumers, it would result in the
type of "whittling away" that antidilution statutes are intended to prevent. A
trademark use requirement artificially cuts off a trademark owner's ability to
offer evidence to that effect.
Moreover, no doctrinal reason mandates that ornamental or merchandising
uses cannot dilute the drawing power of the appropriated distinctive mark.57

no likelihood of confusion, but granting relief under blurring prong), aft'd, 694 F.2d 145 (7th
Cir. 1982); Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 382 (Or. 1983) (affirming injunction
granted under blurring prong, and also affirming findings of no likelihood of confusion and no
tamishment).
52. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 5.05[9] (noting the "liberal state policy of granting
relief where there is no likelihood of confusion" under the Federal Lanham Act).
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. i.
54. See supra note 37.
55. These forms of nontrademark use are commonly referred to as "ornamental" or
"merchandising" uses.
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. i.
57. Ornamental uses, like many trademark uses, often attempt to poach on the goodwill
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Thus, the trademark use requirement of the Tentative Draft, and to a lesser
degree the comments to the final version of section 25, seem to beg the
ultimate question: whether dilution or tarnishment can occur as a result of a
nontrademark use. If so, the result is illogical from the perspective of the
trademark owner, because the damage that results from a trademark use may
be indistinguishable from, or at least comparable to, the damage caused by a
nontrademark use. 8
In addition to these substantive matters, the failure to protect against
merchandising uses also raises serious policy concerns for trademark owners.
Making trademark use a prerequisite for liability condones the conduct of a
free rider who, at the expense of the trademark owner, appropriates the equity
built up in a mark without assuming any of the risk required to develop
commercial drawing power of a well-known "congenial symbol."5 9 Yet, the
trademark owner's willingness to take risks and invest resources to develop
goodwill in a valuable intangible asset on which the public can rely and make
purchasing decisions is a core principle of trademark law not addressed by
section 25(1) of the Tentative Draft.
B. The "Association" Requirement of Section 25:
A Response to Criticisms of the Tentative Draft
In response to concerns over the trademark use requirement, the Reporters
revised the black letter portion of section 25(1) to require an "association"
between the mark used by the actor and the goods, services or business of the
actor. As published in its final form, section 25(1) provides: "An actor is
subject to liability under an antidilution statute if the actor uses such a
designation in a manner that is likely to associate the other's mark with the
goods, services or business of the actor . . . ." As indicated by the
emphasis, the Reporters replaced the trademark use requirement of the
Tentative Draft with what appears to be a more flexible and liberal "association" requirement.
Under this interpretation, the final version of section 25 of the Restatement provides a mechanism for trademark owners to offer evidence of dilution
in cases involving nontrademark use. Despite its comparative advantages,
however, the "association" requirement raises questions of its own. First,
section 25 does not define the term "association" and offers little or no
guidance for interpreting the term. As a result, in contrast to the relatively

developed in a well-known mark. Such poaching is a wrong specifically targeted by dilution
statutes. See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
58. Swann & Davis, supra note 12, at 243-44.
59. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
60. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25(1) (emphasis added).
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clear standard under the trademark use requirement, the final version of
section 25(1) is open to expansive interpretation. For example, Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "association" as "something linked
in memory or imagination with a thing or person." 61 This very broad
definition provides no limits on the types of "links" that might result in an
"association" under section 25(l).62
Although uncertainty detracts from the effectiveness of the Restatement,
a countervailing consideration suggests that the "association" requirement was
not intended to be ambiguous. Because the Reporters did not revise the
comments to section 25 to reflect the substitution of "association" for the
previous trademark use requirement, the comments can be read to suggest that
"association" connotes a broad concept of trademark use.63 Although the
change to the "association" standard in the black letter portion of section 25
is evidence that trademark use is not necessary, the comments make it more
difficult to support this interpretation. As a result, while the revisions to the
Tentative Draft alleviate some of the expressed criticisms and concerns that the
Tentative Draft provides insufficient protection to trademark owners, the final
version of the Restatement raises new questions about the scope of liability
under dilution statutes.
IV. SECTION 25(2) OF THE RESTATEMENT: CONVERGENCE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TRADEMARKS

One of the most controversial developments in unfair competition law
involves the use of trademarks as a mechanism for social commentary or

"parody."' Parody and other forms of commentary and satire have existed
for centuries. In more recent times, the increasing significance of trademarks
as both valuable corporate assets and icons of Americana has made them
effective tools for conveying editorial or humorous messages about a myriad
of issues, including the trademarks themselves, the owners and uses of the
marks, or society in general. As with other tools of modem speech, the use

61. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 110 (9th ed. 1991); see also
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 132-33 (1969) ("5a: the mental

connection or bond existing between any sensations, perceptions, ideas or feelings that to a
subject or observer have a relational significance with one another.").
62. Of course, broad interpretation of the definition of association might reduce the concerns
of the critics of Section 25 of the Tentative Draft.
63. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. c ("The rule stated in this Section
distinguishes between those cases in which the actor uses another's designation to identify the
actor's own goods or services and those cases in which the actor uses the other's designation in
some other manner.").
64. For purposes of this article, the term "parody" refers to all types of message or
commentary uses of marks that "comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or disparage" under
Section 25(2) of the Restatement.
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of trademarks in parody implicates the speaker's First Amendment rights in
ways that make bright-line rules difficult to fashion. Because the trademark
parodist, or speaker, "borrows" from the commercial magnetism cultivated by
another, the speaker's First Amendment rights are not absolute,6 but must
be balanced against competing property rights of the trademark owner.
Although the analysis appears straightforward, courts have struggled to
develop a consistent and coherent body of law governing trademark parody
cases. 6
Primarily, courts have failed to develop a reliable legal framework or
"test" based on objective criteria for evaluating conflicts between First
Amendment rights and the property rights of the trademark owner. Instead,
judicial analysis of trademark parodies often turn on subjective judicial
determinations of right and wrong. The inability to develop a viable First
Amendment test for trademark parodies contrasts starkly with rules developed
in other contexts of trademark jurisprudence.67 Although it is often said that
no trademark dispute is alike and each case must be evaluated based on the
facts,6" this principle may be overstated as applied to the development of
legal tests for evaluating the facts in most trademark litigation. Factual
differences between two cases may have determinative significance, but the
likelihood of confusion standard in each circuit provides consistent road maps
to their resolution.
In contrast, the absence of a reliable and consistent test in parody dilution
cases might make factually similar cases unrecognizable under the analyses of
different courts. Even after a decade, one commentator's observations about
the inconsistent application of dilution statutes in the parody context remain
accurate:
The law governing trademark parody remains a muddle in both principle
and practice. Courts addressing the problem of trademark parody have not
adequately reconciled the rights of the parodist with those of the trademark
owner. A major source of difficulty has been a growing but incomplete
judicial acceptance of more expansive trademark rights, a trend character-

65. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect parodist from liability), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 903 (1995). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (fair use provision of Copyright Act).
66. See Arlen W. Langvardt, ProtectedMarks and ProtectedSpeech: Establishingthe First
Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody Cases, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 671, 724 (1992)
("[Miost courts deciding trademark parody cases have either ignored the possible First
Amendment issues or dealt with them in an abbreviated, unprincipled fashion.").
67. See, e.g., 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23.03[1l], at23-43 to 23-45 (discussinggeneral
agreement among the circuits of the factors used in assessing likelihood of confusion).
68. Id. § 23.11, at 23-67 to 23-68 ("Legal precedent, while controlling the questions to be
asked, is not controlling as to the result of a conflict because each case must rest on the totality
of its own facts as to likelihood of confusion.") (footnote omitted).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss4/4

14

Al;exander and Heilbronner: An Analysis of the Dilution Section of the Restatement (Third) of
1996]
DILUTION ANALYSIS

ized by movement away from the traditional "confusion" definition of
infringement, which forbids only those unauthorized uses of a mark that
are likely to confuse consumers as to a product's origin or sponsorship,
toward a broader "dilution" test, which precludes all unauthorized uses
69

that would lessen the mark's "distinctiveness."

Although the current "muddled" state of affairs is not necessarily the result of
an evolution from a confusion test to a dilution test, the application of dilution
statutes to trademark parodies has contributed significantly to the problem.
Under traditional infringement theory, the existence of a likelihood of
confusion weighs heavily against the First Amendment interests of the speaker.7" When the "speech" creates external costs such as confusion or deception
of the public, First Amendment considerations are not dispositive. 7 1
When applying a dilution statute to a trademark parody, however,
likelihood of confusion is often not a factor. Thus, courts lose a convenient
basis for decision. The property interests at stake include those of the
trademark owner, who does not want to stand by while the drawing power of
a very valuable property, its mark, is drained or blemished.72 Balanced
against this right is the valuable and important First Amendment speech
interest of the trademark parodist. In many cases, another equitable consideration, unjust enrichment, weighs in favor of the trademark owner.7 This
factor is the unfair benefit that the parodist obtains by using the property of,
and appropriating valuable goodwill of, the trademark owner. Under this
scenario, the interests of the owner and the speaker often appear to be relative
equals.

69. Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 1080 (footnotes omitted).
70. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) ("mhe
protection afforded by the First Amendment does not give Novak license to infringe the rights
of Mutual."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
71. Balducci, 28 F.3d at 776 ("A parody creating a likelihood of confusion may be subject
to a trademark infringement action.") (citing Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989), for the proposition that confusing
parodies are "vulnerable under trademark law").
72. Regarding a frustrated trademark owner's inability to combat diluting uses of its marks,
one court has stated: "The basis for this [dilution] cause of action is the belief that the owner of
these marks should not have to stand by and watch the dimunition [sic] in their value as a result
of unauthorized uses by others." Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
73. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp.
1031, 1040 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (dilution of CABBAGE PATCH KIDS by "Gargage Pail Kids"
parody on Topps' bubble gum cards established in part because "'defendant is borrowing
plaintiff's good will to make it the butt of a joke."') (quoting 2 J. THOMAS McCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:15, at 165 (1973)).
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A. The Restatement Approach to Trademark Parodies
Recognizing these issues, section 25(2) of the Restatement favors First
Amendment considerations at the expense of the property rights of the
trademark owner. Attempting to state a clear standard for determining when
application of a dilution statute impinges a speaker's First Amendment rights,
section 25(2) of the Restatement states the rule for diluting or tarnishing
trademark parodies:
One who uses a designation that resembles the trademark, trade name,
collective mark, or certification mark of another, not in a manner that is
likely to associate the other's mark with the goods, services, or business
of the actor, but rather to comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or
disparage the other or the other's goods, services, business or mark, is
subject to liability without proof of a likelihood of confusion only if the

actor's conduct meets the requirements of a cause of action for defamation,
invasion of privacy, or injurious falsehood. 74
By using the phrase "but rather," the black letter portion of section 25(2)
suggests that a use "in a manner that is likely to associate the other's mark
with the goods, services, or business of the actor" cannot also be a use that is
"to comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or disparage the other. "7
Stripped to its essential terms, section 25(2) implies that First Amendment
considerations should prevent application of a dilution statute in all cases in
which a trademark parody does not "associate" the owner's mark with the
goods, services or business of the speaker. In support of this rule, the
comments to section 25(2) discuss the free speech considerations involved in
nontrademark uses of another's mark:
[E]xtension of the antidilution statutes to protect against damaging
nontrademarkuses raises substantial free speech issues and duplicates other
potential remedies better suited to balance the relevant interests.
Use of another's trademark, not as a means of identifying the user's own
goods or services, but as an incident of speech directed at the trademark
owner ... raises serious free speech concerns that cannot be easily
accommodated under traditional trademark doctrine.76

These comments identify the relevant issues (damaging trademark use
versus First Amendment rights), but the proposed solution of section 25(2)

74.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 2, § 25(2) (emphasis added).

75. Id. § 25(2).

76. Id. § 25 cmt. i (emphasis added).
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could raise as many questions as it attempts to answer. It is unclear whether
the test of section 25(2) accurately reflects existing law or is sufficiently
flexible to deal with facts that warrant application of dilution statutes. Read
literally, the "but rather" language of section 25(2) states that if an actor's use
of a mark satisfies the "association" standard, it cannot be a trademark
parody. Conversely, trademark parodies are arguably incapable of satisfying
the "association" standard.77 As a practical matter, however, designations
that create an "association" with the actor's goods also may serve to criticize
or ridicule another's mark.
The text of section 25(2) also does not distinguish between primarily
commercial and primarily noncommercial speech, which might be the most
relevant consideration under First Amendment analysis, particularly in
"hybrid" cases involving technical trademark uses that mix parody and
commercial speech.7"
Additionally, unless an alternative commercial tort theory applies, section
25(2) largely disregards the trademark owner's interests in protecting and
managing its brand equity and preserving the commercial magnetism of a
mark. The rule stated in section 25(2) assumes that liability for nonconfusing
trademark parodies is more appropriately dealt with under other branches of
law. It is not clear, however, that the commercial tort theories proposed in the
Restatement are more appropriate or provide adequate viable alternatives to the
trademark owner.
1. The Legal Framework of Section 25(2)
As with liability under section 25(1) of the final version of the Restatement, liability under section 25(2) is premised on satisfaction of the "association" standard, which is conceptually troublesome in the context of trademark
parody. In addition to the lack of guidance for interpreting the word
"association," the standard broadly encompasses and protects many trademark
parodies because, as one commentator has stated: "Parody is at once a
derivative and a creative form of expression; its defining characteristic is that
it incorporates some recognizable features of its object while altering other
features so as to ridicule the object and achieve a humorous or provocative
effect." 7 9
Thus, the key to a successful trademark parody is twofold: (1) imitation
of another's mark, and (2) use of the imitation in a manner that conveys the
speaker's "message." The success of the message is dependent on the success

77. See id. § 25(2).
78. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
79. Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 1079.
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of the imitation, and, in many cases, on an "association" between the imitation
and the speaker's goods, services or business.
Because many trademark parodies might satisfy the "association"
standard, section 25(2) creates interpretive problems. First, a careful reading
of section 25(2) suggests that liability might depend on two mutually exclusive
possibilities: either use of a mark satisfies the "association" standard and is
subject to potential liability, or the use is immune under the First Amendment
because it is to comment on or criticize the mark or the mark owner."
Section 25(2) does not directly address the possibility that certain hybrid
trademark parodies might satisfy both the "association" and parody criteria,
particularly where commercial gain, rather than commentary, is the primary
purpose of the parody."1
The problem with the test set forth in section 25(2) is exemplified by
illustration 5 to section 25(2),2 which draws on the facts of L.L. Bean, Inc.
v. Drake Publishers, Inc. 3 In illustration 5, the Reporters posit that B, a
publisher of an adult magazine, publishes a bawdy parody of A's catalog using
an imitation of A's mark.' The illustration concludes that "B is not subject
to liability to A for tarnishment under an antidilution statute because B has not
used A's mark in a manner that is likely to create an associationbetween the
mark and B's own goods, services, or business."'
Notwithstanding the fact that A likely would attempt to offer evidence to
show that the parody satisfies the "association" requirement of section 25(2),
the question is not as straightforward as illustration 5 suggests. Arguably, one
of the recognized goals of adult magazines is to serve as forums for outrageous
commentary not found in other publications. 6 Thus, beyond pure humor, the

80. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25(2); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
81. For example, if the parody consists of a third-party use of a company's brand name to sell
commentary T-shirts or posters for the primary purpose of raising funds. See, e.g., Coca-Cola
Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enjoining defendant from
selling poster replication of Coca-Cola's trademark that substituted the word "Cocaine" for
"Coca-Cola"); Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg., Co. 304 F. Supp.
1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (refusing to enjoin defendant from distributing poster with pregnant Girl
Scout because public would acknowledge it as a lampoon).

82.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 2, § 25 cmt. i, illus. 5.

83. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
84. The illustration assumes, and so do the authors for purposes of this discussion, that B's
use otherwise has the capacity to tarnish or dilute the value of A's mark.
85. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. i, illus. 5 (emphasis added). For purposes of the
illustration, the Reporters did not address facts in the L.L. Bean case that led the court to
determine that the First Amendment precluded liability under Maine's dilution statute. The court
ultimately determined that the defendant's speech was noncommercial, and therefore, entitled to
broad First Amendment protection. See L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 32-33.
86. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (finding Hustler
Magazine's parody advertisement of Jerry Falwell's "first time," although outrageous, protected
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parody in illustration 5 might serve another important function for B, namely
confirmation that B's publication is the type that takes a "no-holds-barred"
approach to social commentary. In light of Webster's broad definition of
"association,"87 and the Restatement's lack of guidance as to the proper
interpretation of the word, this link might satisfy the "association" standard.
An association between the parodic use of A's mark and B's publication might
exist because consumers are likely to view the trademark parody (and others
like it) as one of the reasons they purchase B's publication. Indeed, such
trademark parodies may be part of B's marketing strategy intended to alert and
confirm to consumers that B makes liberal use of such icons of Americana.
Use of trademark parody to satisfy a commercial purpose reduces the
speaker's First Amendment interests, s" yet, on behalf of those interests,
section 25(2) purports to eliminate the trademark owner's ability to satisfy the
"association" standard or investigate the commercial purposes of the parody.
Under this analysis, the parodic element always trumps the tarnishing effect
of the parody and the speaker's commercial purpose.
As with section 25(1), the comments to section 25(2) provide a potential
resolution of the conceptual quandary caused by the "association" standard,
suggesting that liability under section 25(2) might depend on trademark use
rather than the broader "association" concept. In this regard, comment i to
section 25(2)89 elaborates on the "association" standard:
Nontrademark uses, because they do not create an association with a
different user's goods, services, or business, are unlikely to dilute the
distinctiveness of a mark ....

For example, the use of another's mark in

comparative advertising or as mere ornamentation on the subsequent user's
goods does not dilute the distinctiveness of the mark by associating the
mark as a symbol of identification with different goods or services or with
a different business.90
Comment i adds that free speech concerns preclude dilution liability when the
parodist uses another's mark "not as a means of identifying the user's own
goods or services, but as an incident of speech directed at the trademark
by the First Amendment).
87. VEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 110.
88. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995) (discussing factors that reduced defendant's claim of
a purely editorial purpose, and therefore, "suggest[ed] that [defendant] sought to do far more than
just 'conjure up' an image of Anheuser-Busch in the minds of its readers"); Hard Rock Cafe
Licensing Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (W.D. Wash. 1991) ("A
defendant's claim of parody will be disregarded where the purpose of the similarity is to
capitalize on a famous mark's popularity for the defendant's own commercial use.").
89. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 cmt. i.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
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owner ..
.91 If the "association" test boils down to a trademark use
inquiry, some of the conceptual barriers that might prevent consistent
application of section 25(2) are eliminated because, unlike the "association"
standard, the trademark use requirement attempts to create a bright-line
rule. 92
Section 25(2) has doctrinal defects even if the "association" standard is
viewed as the equivalent of trademark use. A hybrid trademark parody might
consist of a trademark use that comments on or criticizes the target mark or
its owner. Under section 25(2), however, the parodic element may trump all
tarnishing effect and any commercial purpose of the speaker. Drawing again
on the facts of illustration 5, and assuming B, the publisher, used a parodic
imitation of A's trademark to market and sell an actual catalog, A's use would
appear to be both a trademark use and a use intended to comment on A, A's
mark, or some other aspect of society. 93 Section 25(2) appears to provide no
middle ground for resolving such "hybrid" cases involving both parody and
a trademark use. 94 Thus, a court interpreting the comments to section 25(2)

91. Id. Comment i goes on to state that only nontrademark uses raise free speech concerns
sufficient to preclude dilution liability.
92. Despite its apparent clarity, the trademark use requirementalso might be difficult to apply
in certain cases. For example, query whether the First Amendment would preclude liability under
section 25 if a poster bearing an otherwise protected trademark parody were placed at the point
of purchase for related goods such as birth-control products? Cf. Girl Scouts of the United States
v. Personality Posters Mfg., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (denying dilution relief against
the manufacturer of posters depicting a pregnant girl in a Girl Scouts' uniform and the slogan
"Be Prepared"). Alternatively, would liability arise if the allegedly protectable parody hypothetical from L.L. Bean discussed in illustration 5 to section 25(2) were subsequently placed on Tshirts?
93. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)
("Lardashe" used for jeans); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F.
Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Super Stud" and "Wonder Wench" for singing telegram service);
Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Gucchi Goo" and
well-known red and green bands trade dress used for diaper bags).
94. The Reporters disagree with this proposition, stating in the Foreword that section 25
accounts for all allegedly "hybrid" cases. In their view, if a use satisfies the "association"
standard, protection may be available under section 25(1) "whether of not the use is also a
parody." Under this theory, the First Amendment protection purportly provided by section 25(2)
applied only if the defendant's use does not satisfy the "association" standard; accordingly section
25(2) would add nothing to the rule established by section 25(1) because it provides First
Amendment protection only in cases where there is no liablility in the first place. In contrast, this
article contends that, under a careful analysis of section 25(2), particularly the effect of the "but
rather" language, section 25(2) purports to create an exception in cases where the conditions for
liability under section 25(1) are satisfied, but First Amendment considerations preclude
application of a dilution statute. As a result, section 25(2) is in derogation of section 25(1). If
section 25(2) does not create some type of exception, then it merely states that, if protection is
not available under section 25(1), the actor must look elsewhere for a cause of action for
disparagement.
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would likely consider alternative legal frameworks for First Amendment
analysis. Although aware that the commercial speech doctrine provided a
potential alternative test, 95 the Reporters adopted a standard that does not
inquire directly into the commercial or noncommercial nature of the trademark
parody.9 6 Adopting a commercial speech test might have provided less
protection for the "substantial free speech issues"' noted by the Reporters,
but it could have led to a more workable standard under section 25(2).
2. Whether a Viable Alternative to the Legal Framework of
Section 25(2) Exists
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the judiciary and
commentators have struggled to balance the First Amendment interests of a
trademark parodist against the competing property interests of the owner of the
targeted mark, and judicial responses to free speech claims based on trademark
parody have varied widely." s Several courts have applied traditional infringement doctrines to parodies without any apparent concern for First Amendment
claims of the speaker. 9 These courts stretch the limits of traditional infringement doctrine to find a likelihood of confusion, basing their conclusions on
language and rationales indicative of a broader concern for damage to,
tarnishment of, or unjust trading upon brand equity developed in a mark."°

95. See, RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25(2) cmt. i (discussing the commercial speech
doctrine as a paradigm for resolving trademark cases in favor of the speaker).
96. Comment i suggests that most, if not all, trademark parodies constitute protectable
noncommercial speech, stating: "The expression of an idea by means of the use of another's
trademark in a parody, for example, will often lie within the substantial constitutional protection
accorded noncommercial speech and may thus be the subject of liability only in the most narrow
circumstances." Id. (emphasis added). The comments do not elaborate on when a trademark
parody will not be deemed noncommercial speech, leaving open another potential issue as to
coverage.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
99. See e.g, Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433,434-35 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963) (enjoining "Where there's life ... there's bugs" on
the basis of likelihood of confusion with plaintiff's "Where there's life ... there's Bud");
Wendy's Int'l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816, 824 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (defendant's
parodic use of plaintiff's slogans and "Little Wendy" mascot enjoined with no extended discussion of parody defense).
100. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
204-05 (2d Cir. 1979); Chemical Corp., 306 F.2d at 437-38; Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1188-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (discussing plaintiff's "property right" in its
mark). These decisions are the basis for criticism by several commentators who argue that the
dilution doctrine extends too much protection to the trademark owner. See Shaughnessy, supra
note 9, at 1094-96; Langvardt, supra note 66, at 689-92. But see Swann & Davis, supra note 12,
at 220-22 (arguing that these cases provide judicial foundations of support for the notion that
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Other courts undertake extensive First Amendment analyses under the
commercial speech doctrine,'O determining whether the parody constitutes
commercial or noncommercial speech and applying the appropriate constitutional test to determine whether the speech is protected."~ Finally, commentators have argued that the right of publicity is an appropriate mechanism for
evaluating a trademark owner's rights in "the persona of a brand,"" ° and
may provide an alternative approach for balancing the constitutional issues." ° Indeed, in view of their value on licensed products, the marks of
professional sports teams and universities, as well as marks such as COKE,
DISNEY and those of other commercial enterprises, arguably are entitled to
no less protection against commercial piracy through dilution than are the
rights of publicity relied upon by the estates of Elvis Presley, Marilyn
Monroe, or other celebrities.
The Supreme Court has not considered directly the convergence of the
First Amendment rights of a trademark parodist with the rights of a trademark
owner. In an analogous context, however, the Court has suggested that the
commercial speech doctrine is the proper mode of analysis for speech-based
defenses to trademark infringement and dilution. In San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,'05 the Court rejected a
strong First Amendment challenge to section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act

brand equity should be protected as property from virtually any trespass).
101. Commercial speech is "speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction.'" Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973))). The test for determining the constitutionality of commercial speech has four parts:
(1) whether the speech pertains to lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the
government has a substantial interest in taking the action that restricts the speech; (3) whether the
government's action directly advanced the underlying interest; and (4) whether the government
action was no more extensive than necessary to fulfill the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
102. See Balducci, 28 F.3d at 775-77; L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32.
103. Swann & Davis, supra note 12, at 234; see also Ellen P. Winner, Right ofldentity: Right
of Publicity and Protectionfor a Trademark's "Persona," 71 TRADEMARK REP. 193 (1981).
Thus, if SUPERMAN and WONDER WOMAN and other famous marks function as brand
personas, arguably rights in these marks are analogous to an individual's right of publicity. See
Swann & Davis, supra note 12, at 226 (citing J.T. Plummer, How Personality Makes a
Difference, 24 J. ADVERTISING REs., Dec. 1984/Jan. 1985, at 27, 27-31 for the proposition that
"[m]any brands have their own 'personalities'").
104. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 31, § 28.05 ("[With a balancing between the property right
of the right of publicity and the policy of free speech, a given unauthorized use of a person's
identity will fall within one of two categories: the challenged use is either 'communicative' or
'commercial.'").
105. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). Because San FranciscoArts does not involve a trademarkparody,
the magnitude of the defendants' free speech interests was significantly reduced.
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of 1978,16 which grants the United States Olympic Committee broad rights
to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the word "Olympic. " 7 Indicating that the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech might provide the proper test in the parody setting, the Court
stated: "To the extent that [section] 110 applies to uses 'for the purpose of
trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or services,' . . . its application is
to commercial speech. " 1° 8
Commenting on the San FranciscoArts case, the Reporters state that the
commercial speech analysis turned on the distinction between trademark and
nontrademark use."° The Reporters' Note to section 25(2) classifies San
Francisco Arts as a case in which the distinction between trademark and
nontrademark use is "explicit." 1 Although the Reporters are correct in
concluding that GAY OLYMPIC GAMES was a trademark use, nothing in the
Court's opinion suggests that trademark use was dispositive to the finding that
the defendants engaged in commercial speech. In fact, the Court rejected the
defendants' claim that section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act is overbroad
under the First Amendment because it restricts promotional, as well as
commercial, uses of the word "Olympic." Such promotional uses could include
nontrademark uses and parodies, yet the Court found the Act valid on its face.
Moreover, the Court applied commercial speech principles notwithstanding the
allegedly expressive nature of the defendants' speech, stating:
The mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to a purely
commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amendment right to
'appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those who have sown.' The USOC's
right to prohibit use of the word 'Olympic' in the promotion of athletic
events is at the core of its legitimate property right."'
The legal framework applied in San FranciscoArts is a logical approach
to potential conflicts between First Amendment rights and the interests of a
trademark owner. The commercial speech doctrine is sufficiently well-

106. 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1994) [hereinafter Act].
107. San FranciscoArts &Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 524.
108. Id. at 535 (quoting the Act). The Court's rationale drew upon the appropriation of the
plaintiff's property rights, which supported liability because the defendant sought to "exploit the
'commercial magnetism' of the word [that was] given [commercial] value by the [plaintiff]." Id.
at 539 (citation omitted) (quoting Justice Frankfurter's comments in Mishawaka Rubber &
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)).
109. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25 reporters' note to cmt. i.
110. Id.
111. San FrancisoArts &Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
(quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-240 (1918) (footnote
omitted)). In addition to the property interests at stake, the Court noted that significant public
policy considerations supported the speech restriction. Id. at 537-38.
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developed to serve as a stable mode of analysis in trademark parody cases.
Notably, San Francisco Arts does not stand for the proposition that all
trademark parodies, or even all hybrid parodies, constitute commercial
2
speech.1
The determination of whether a parody is commercial or noncommercial
should be evaluated on a case by case basis. The factors that might distinguish
commercial from noncommercial parodies are best exemplified by the analyses
in several cases that reached sensible, but different, results in response to a
First Amendment defense to a dilution claim. Generally in those cases,
resolution of the commercial speech issue depended on whether the primary
purpose of the parody was the communication of a message and whether use
of the trademark bore any relationship
to the message, not whether the parody
113
was a technical trademark use.
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications,"4 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's First Amendment parody defense
after the defendant published a fake advertisement for "Michelob Oily" beer
on the back cover of a humor magazine. Enjoining the advertisement, the
court relied on several factors that suggest a concern for the commercial nature
of defendant's speech including: (1) the ad parody was placed on the back
cover of the magazine where real advertisements are routinely located," 5 and
(2) the ad included "only a tiny disclosure" that it was an editorial parody." 6
The advertisement also suggested that Anheuser-Busch's products were
contaminated with oil, yet "[t]his unsupported attack was not even remotely
necessary to [the defendant's] goals of commenting on the Gasconade oil spill
and water pollution generally."" 7 Absent a sufficient relationship between
the imitation of the mark and the message conveyed, the court found that the
parody was more an attempt to appropriate the magnetism of the mark for
defendant's commercial purposes than an attempt to convey a particular
message. Although the court did not expressly name the commercial speech
doctrine, the court's analysis resembled a commercial speech case (i.e., a

112. See Stop The Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1121
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the use of the slogan "Stop The Olympic Prison" on a poster by
an organization protesting the use of the Olympic village as a prison did not violate the Act
because "[t]he poster was not used 'for the purpose of trade,' or 'to induce the sale of any goods
or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition.'")
(quoting the Act).
113. Contrary to the Reporters' statement in the Foreword, the authors do not believe that a
commercial purpose or a profit motive, by itself, is sufficient to create commercial speech.
114. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995).
115. Id. at 775.
116. Id. at 778.
117. Id. at 778.
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significant factor in the decision was whether the defendant successfully
communicated the editorial nature of the parody).
In contrast, in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 118 the court
overturned an injunction against the publisher of "High Society" magazine,
which published a sexual parody mocking plaintiffs catalogs. Noting that
important First Amendment considerations prevented application of dilution
statutes to the extent they apply to noncommercial parodies," 9 the court
found that the defendant's parody was "editorial or artistic," and therefore
noncommercial, 20 based on the following factors: the defendant's use was
a nontrademark use,' and the defendant did not seek to merchandise its
products under the guise of trademark parody." 2 The court noted the
following facts:
The article was labelled as 'humor' and 'parody' in the magazine's table
of contents section; it took up two pages in a one-hundred-page issue;
neither the article nor appellant's trademark was featured on the front or
back cover of the magazine .... [The defendant] never intended to market
the 'products' displayed in the parody. 1"

Thus, as in Anheuser-Busch, the court focused on the legitimacy of the speech
claim (not necessarily the speech itself) and the relationship between the use
of the mark and the message conveyed.' 24
L.L. Bean provides insight into the suitability of the commercial speech
doctrine in parody cases. However, the L.L. Bean court limited the reach of
its holding, stating that it had "no occasion to consider the constitutional limits
which might be imposed on the application of anti-dilution statutes to
unauthorized uses of trademarks on products whose principal purpose is to
convey a message." 121
Thus, while the Reporters view L.L. Bean as demon118. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
119. Id. at 30-31.
120. Id. at 32.
121. Id. at 33.
122. Id. at 32.
123. L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 32.
124. Cf. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994), where the
court stated:
Sellers of commercial products who wish to attract attention to their commercials or
products and thereby increase sales by poking fun at widely recognized marks of
noncompeting products, .. . risk diluting the selling power of the mark that is made
fun of. When this occurs, not for worthy purposes of expression, but simply to sell
products, that purpose can easily be achieved in other ways. The potentially diluting
effect is even less deserving of protection when the object of the joke is the mark of
a directly competing product.
Id. (citations omitted).
125. L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 32 n.4 (citing Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 775
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strative of the proper First Amendment treatment of trademark parodies, the
court expressly limited its application to a set of facts that does not involve the
most difficult "hybrid" situations.
Of course, neither L.L. Bean nor Balducci presents a bright line standard.
Hard facts make for difficult decisions, and neither involved a strong political
or social commentary. 126 Difficult cases involving strong social commentary
might include a parody of a cigarette trademark used on T-shirts by a nonprofit cancer treatment society to raise funds for an anti-smoking campaign,127 or a parody of an oil company's trademark is used on posters sold
by an environmental group attacking a company found guilty of water
pollution. Moreover, classification of a parody as commercial speech does not
necessarily result in dilution liability. A trademark owner still has to prove
a likelihood of dilution by blurring or tarnishment. 2 s

F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1985)) (emphasis added).
126. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 327 n.8 (Powell, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872 (1992) (alleged parody of various marks for
BUDWEISER beer used to sell T-shirts proclaiming, inter alia, Myrtle Beach as "The King of
Beaches"). Commenting on the significance of the editorial purpose of a parody, Justice Powell
perceptively captured the essential issue, stating: "Only parody in this 'editorial or artistic' sense
serves sufficiently strong First Amendment values to override government interests in trademark
protection. Such would be the case, for instance, if Mothers Against Drunk Driving marketed Tshirts bearing a caricature of the Budweiser trademark." Id. (citation omitted).
Although the L&L Wings court determined that the jury's finding of no likely confusion was
supported by sufficient evidence, the result might have been different had the case arisen after
South Carolina passed a dilution statute in 1994. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165(A) (Law.
Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995). For purposes of disclosure, it should be noted that the authors or
their firm had substantive involvement in the Petition for Certiorari in the case and have
represented Anheuser-Busch in other matters.
127. The Section of Intellectual Property Law of the American Bar Association clearly outlined
the constitutional issues in a T-shirt parody case, stating:
[W]hen a parody of a mark appears on a t-shirt that would not be purchased by
consumers but for the appearance of the parody on the t-shirt, is such use of the
parody in a commercial or non-commercial context? One could argue that customers
buy the t-shirt not because of the source, but because of the message that it conveys,
resulting in protected speech. On the other hand, one could argue that the use of the
parody in this context is for effecting a commercial transaction (buying the t-shirt),
and although free speech is the cornerstone of a free society, it cannot and should not
be used to disguise an underlying economic motive for damaging and palming off of
another's success in creating a popular image or good will in connection with its
products or services.
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, Section of Intellectual Prop. L. Annual Report 1993-1994 151 (1994).
128. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 508 (2d Cir.
1996) ("Spa'am" for name of "likeable, positive" porcine puppet character in children's movie
not likely to dilute SPAM for lunch meat, despite defendant's intent to poke fun at the famous
luncheon meat) ("Therefore, in the instant case, where (1) there is no evidence that Henson's use
will cause negative associations, (2) Henson is not a direct competitor, and (3) the parody inheres
in the product, we find that there is no likelihood of dilution under a tarnishment theory.");
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Although a well-developed, definitive test for First Amendment cases
involving trademark parodies has yet to crystallize, the commercial speech
doctrine provides a variety of objective criteria on which to base a reasoned
result. By taking a broad doctrinal protective approach to the First Amendment
question, section 25(2) of the Restatement gives too little weight to several
important considerations that might limit the parodist's free speech rights.
Thus, while serious and appropriate free speech concerns are at stake in
trademark parody cases, they should not necessarily and uniformly trump
factors such as the property right of the trademark owner, the nature and
context of the speech, the unjust enrichment of the speaker, the consideration
that parody has commercial and noncommercial traits, the right of the public
not to be misled and the nexus between the message conveyed and the manner
in which the mark is used.
B. Whether Section 25(2) Provides Sufficient Alternative Remedies
to Protect the Interests of the Trademark Owner
Linked to the viability of the test set forth in section 25(2) of the
Restatement is the conclusion that the rule is sound, in part, because
alternative remedies are available under defamation, invasion of privacy, or
injurious falsehood causes of action. 129 In this regard, comment i to section
25(2) highlights several alternative tort theories that, because of "their welldeveloped limitations[,] can better accommodate the actor's right of free
expression."' 30 These alternative remedies include:
1. A cause of action for defamation based on use or commentary
that defames the reputation of the trademark owner;
2. Causes of action under Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 623A and 626 based on false statements harmful to the
pecuniary interests of another or that disparage the other's goods;
and
3. A cause of action under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652E for situations in which the parodist places an individual
before the public in a false light that would be highly offen3
sive.'

Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1040
(N.D. Ga. 1986) ("There was also testimony ... that any association of Garbage Pail Kids with
Cabbage Patch Kids would disparage the wholesome image plaintiff attempts to present for its
products. The court finds that there is more than sufficient evidence that tarnishment exists.
.") (citation omitted).
129. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25(2).
130. Id. § 25 cmt. i.
131. Id.
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Several factors suggest that the remedies proposed in section 25(2) may
not be adequate, or even available, to remedy a wholesale appropriation of the
goodwill and commercial magnetism of a mark for allegedly parodic purposes,
particularly where profit is the primary motivation of the speaker. First, a
corporate or business plaintiff in a defamation suit must show that its overall
business reputation has been harmed.' 32 "A decrease in the value of the
trademark itself does not mean that the plaintiffs reputation is harmed," 133
and, as a result, "trademark parody-based defamation claims tend to falter on
the basic harm to reputation element ... 34 Perhaps even more troublesome are the evidentiary burdens of (1) falsity,3 5 which is likely to be most
difficult in the context of a parody that is intended to be perceived, not as a
statement of fact, but as a humorous or editorial comment; and (2) constitutional fault,' 36 which requires proof of "actual malice" under the stringent
37
standards set forth by the Supreme Court.
Although a "disparagement [or false light] claim is more plausible in the
trademark parody setting than a defamation claim because a trademark
provides the sort of economic interest that may be adversely affected for
purposes of a disparagement claim," 3 ' a disparagement or false light
plaintiff still has the onerous burden of demonstrating that the use of its mark
is likely to be perceived as a statement of fact.' 39 Because of the burdensome
proof requirements of the alternative causes of action set forth in section 25(2),
"it is likely that disparagement [and defamation] will maintain a secondary
position behind infringement and dilution claims in trademark parody
litigation."140 Accordingly, in view of the significant interests of the
trademark owner, an interpretation of the Restatement in a manner that would
make the word "association" the equivalent of narrow trademark use to qualify
for dilution protection does not follow the weight of extensive case law and
goes too far in weighing First Amendment rights against property right to limit

132. Langvardt, supra note 66, at 709.
133. Id. at 709 n.200.
134. Id. at 709 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986); Stop The Olympic
Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1124-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Girl
Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1234, 1235-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
135. Id. at 709-10.
136. Id. at 710.
137. See Langvardt, supra note 66, at 710 n.203 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964)).
138. Id. at 711.
139. Id. at 711 n.209.
140. Id. at 711-12 (footnotes omitted).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss4/4

28

Al;exander and Heilbronner: An Analysis of the Dilution Section of the Restatement (Third) of

1996]
"the proper scope of.
utes." 141

DILUTION ANALYSIS
.

.the statutory action created by the antidilution stat-

V. CONCLUSION

The Restatement is a landmark contribution to both legal scholarship and
the pragmatic need of the courts and the bar. Generally, it provides an
articulate, perceptive and concise reference point to the current status of the
law, and the Reporters fulfilled their role in making final decisions as to the
wording of many difficult passages. In areas in which the law was unclear,
they disclosed that fact and took a position, stating what they believed to be
the better reasoning and the better line of authority. In areas yet unformalized,
they undertook to reason where the law should go.
This article focuses on one of those unformalized areas, dilution, which
is an extremely controversial topic. On balance, we applaud the Reporters'
decision to utilize the word "association" in lieu of mandating trademark use
as the trigger for application of a dilution statute. We believe "association"
should not be defined too narrowly in its application. With regard to the First
Amendment issues raised by section 25, we believe future case law and
interpretations of the new federal dilution statute should focus on distinctions
between commercial and non-commercial speech, and the communicative
purpose of the use to determine whether First Amendment considerations
override the rights of a trademark owner. In the end, the intent of the
legislatures to protect the commercial magnetism of a mark as a valuable
property right and the constitutional rights that govern the protection of
property must be balanced carefully and equitably against the constitutional
rights of freedom of expression.

141. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 25(2) cmt. i.
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